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Setting the Stage for Ferguson: Housing 
Discrimination and Segregation in St. Louis 
Rigel C. Oliveri* 
“What’s past is prologue.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The St. Louis Metropolitan area, which includes St. Louis City and St. 
Louis County (which itself contains ninety-one separate municipalities), is 
one of the most racially segregated places in the United States.2  One com-
mon measure of segregation is called a dissimilarity index, which refers to the 
evenness with which two groups are spread across component geographic 
areas that make up a larger geographic entity.3  An index score of greater than 
60 is considered high or extreme.4  In 2010, St. Louis’s black-white index 
score was 70.6, the ninth highest in the country.5  Another way to assess seg-
regation is through the isolation index, which measures the extent to which 
members of a particular group are exposed only to each other.6  The black-
white isolation score for St. Louis in 2010 was 62, the eleventh highest in the 
country.7 
This is not an accident.  A century’s worth of discriminatory policies 
and practices have gone into making St. Louis City and its surrounding com-
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law.  B.A., Universi-
ty of Virginia; J.D., Stanford Law School.  The author was formerly a Trial Attorney 
for the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, in the Housing & Civil 
Enforcement Section.  I would like to thank the Missouri Law Review for inviting me 
to be part of this important Symposium.  Thanks are also in order to Cindy Bassett for 
designing the excellent maps and graphics. 
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1. 
 2. Research & Statistics Div. of the St. Louis Cty. Dep’t of Planning, 2007–
2012 Fact Book, ST. LOUIS CTY., MO. i, http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/
Document%20Library/Maps%20and%20GIS/Fact%20Book/Fact%20Book%202007-
2012/introduction.pdf. 
 3. See Douglas S. Massey et al., The Changing Bases of Segregation in the 
United States, 626 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 74, 76 (2009).  The index 
score can also be described as the percentage of one of the two groups that would 
have to move from one geographic component to another geographic area in order to 
produce a distribution that matches that of the larger area.  Id. 
 4. Id. at 77. 
 5. John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults, The Persistence of Segregation in the Me-
tropolis: New Findings from the 2010 Census, US2010 PROJECT 1, 6 (Mar. 24, 2011), 
http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report2.pdf. 
 6. Massey et al., supra note 3. 
 7. Logan & Stults, supra note 5, at 8.  Thus, the average black person in the 
metro area lived in a neighborhood that was 62% black.  See id. 
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munities look the way they do today.  Nor is this without consequence – hy-
persegregation and the discriminatory forces that cause it lead to a host of 
other problems, including wealth disparity, school segregation and inequality, 
and tensions between citizens and law enforcement.  Perhaps most important-
ly, we become a nation of “two societies, one black, one white—separate and 
unequal.”8  Those famous words were written in 1968 by the National Advi-
sory Commission on Civil Disorders, which was formed to address the urban 
riots of the late 1960s.  Those riots occurred in highly segregated communi-
ties across the United States and, in many, the triggering event was an act of 
police brutality against black residents. The Commission warned that more 
violence would ensue if segregated living patterns, racialized policing, and 
overall inequality persisted.  And though much has changed in the ensuing 
decades, the recent events in Ferguson, Missouri, demonstrate that too much 
has remained the same. 
It might be tempting to view what happened in Ferguson as a policing 
problem, one of the many tragic instances of white police officers shooting 
unarmed black men and boys.  Certainly, this is an important piece of the 
story and one which will be explored elsewhere in this Symposium.  Some 
have described the response – weeks of peaceful protests, but also rioting, 
looting, arson, and property damage – as a symptom of community dysfunc-
tion, blaming poverty, poor schools, and lack of employment prospects.  
There may be truth to this description as well, but it remains an oversimplifi-
cation.  To truly understand the events of the fall of 2014, I submit that we 
have to look further back, to what might seem an unlikely source: housing 
discrimination. 
The history of St. Louis is replete with discriminatory housing laws, pol-
icies, and practices: racially restrictive covenants, redlining, blockbusting and 
white flight, and exclusionary zoning.  While these were common in virtually 
every part of the United States, they were particularly egregious, widespread, 
and pervasive in industrial Midwestern cities like Chicago, Detroit, and St. 
Louis – which saw a large influx of blacks migrating from the south at the 
close of the nineteenth century.  In fact, three of the most foundational hous-
ing cases originated in St. Louis.  When we look closely at these cases – not 
just the legal principles that they established but the physical, racial geogra-
phy of the homes, neighborhoods, and cities that were contested – we can see 
how they reflected the racist forces that shaped the reality of modern metro-
politan St. Louis.  This can give us insight into what happened in Ferguson 
and why. 
 
 8. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
REFERENCE SERV., REPORT 1 (1968), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/
8073NCJRS.pdf. 
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II.  A STORY OF SEGREGATION, IN THREE CASES 
A.  Act 1: Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) 
The story begins a century ago, in 1915, when a group of St. Louis real-
tors created an organization, the United Welfare Association, in order to ad-
vocate for a racially exclusionary zoning ordinance.9  The ordinance would 
bar blacks from living on blocks that were more than 75% white (and vice 
versa).10  They succeeded in getting the measure placed on the ballot the fol-
lowing year.11  The measure passed easily, and St. Louis became one of a 
handful of areas around the nation with such a law.12  An identical law was 
struck down by the Supreme Court the following year as a violation of due 
process and property rights, in Buchanan v. Warley.13 
In the absence of explicit laws, the widespread practice of racially-
restrictive covenants began, in which developers and neighborhood associa-
tions placed deed restrictions on properties, preventing them from being oc-
cupied by blacks.14  This practice was promoted by realtors nationwide, but in 
St. Louis, the local real estate industry – which had pressed for the racial zon-
ing measure – was particularly enthusiastic and organized in its support of 
covenants.15  An association called the St. Louis Real Estate Exchange creat-
ed a “Committee on the Protection of Property” whose purpose was to pro-
mote the use of covenants and to help with their enforcement.16  This Com-
mittee provided a “Uniform Restriction Agreement” with model covenant 
language that was used in approximately 85% of the restrictive agreements in 
force.17  Members went door-to-door to help organize neighborhood associa-
tions for the purposes of enacting restrictive covenants.18  The Exchange was 
also a formal party to most of the covenants, and it provided legal assistance 
 
 9. COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE OF THE 
AMERICAN CITY 70 (Glenda Gilmore et al. eds., 2008). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Id. at 71. 
 13. 245 U.S. 60, 80–81 (1917).  Interestingly, the Buchanan case involved a 
white homeowner who wished to sell his house to a black buyer, in violation of the 
zoning law.  Id. at 72–73.  Thus, the Court approached the issue as a matter of the 
white man’s rights to dispose of his property, which were infringed by the law, and 
not as a matter of the black man’s rights to purchase that property.  Id. at 73. 
 14. GORDON, supra note 9, at 73. 
 15. Id. at 79. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.; Richard Rothstein, The Making of Ferguson: Public Policies at the Root 
of Its Troubles, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1, 13 (Oct. 15, 2014), http://s3.epi.org/files/
2014/making-of-ferguson-final.pdf. 
 18. GORDON, supra note 9, at 79. 
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to the neighborhood associations when it came time to enforce the covenants 
in court.19 
Restrictive covenants also became part of federal mortgage policy, as 
carried out by the Home Owners Loan Corporation (“HOLC”) and the Feder-
al Housing Administration (“FHA”).20  From their creation in the mid-1930s 
through the Second World War, these agencies backed the financing of be-
tween one-quarter to one-half of all new home sales.21  The FHA underwrit-
ing manual stated that “protection against some adverse influences,” such as 
“the ingress of undesirable racial or nationality groups,” must be obtained by 
“proper zoning and deed restrictions.”22  “Restrictive covenants should 
strengthen and supplement zoning ordinances,” the manual suggested, and are 
“apt to prove more effective than a zoning ordinance in providing protection 
from adverse influences.”23  The FHA specifically recommended restrictions 
against “occupancy of properties[,] except by the race for which they were 
intended.”24 
Meanwhile, the HOLC drafted a series of “residential security maps” 
which were intended to guide mortgage lending activity.25  While these maps 
took into account factors such as the age of housing stock, they were primari-
ly guided by the racial composition of the neighborhoods.26  In St. Louis, the 
existence of restrictive covenants helped an area gain a highly favorable A or 
B rating.27  Majority black neighborhoods were given the lowest rating – D, 
for Hazardous – and colored red.28  Racially transitional neighborhoods were 
given a C, for “definitely declining,” and colored yellow.29 
All of these actions reflected the racist belief that the presence of blacks 
in a neighborhood would lower property values and bring with it crime and 
other nuisances.  The result was that virtually all of St. Louis’s black popula-
tion was confined to just a few neighborhoods in the center of the City.30  As 
these neighborhoods grew increasingly crowded, there was nowhere that 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 89. 
 21. Id. at 88. 
 22. Rothstein, supra note 17, at 15; GORDON, supra note 9, at 91. 
 23. GORDON, supra note 9, at 91. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 92. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  See also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY AND NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN 
APARTHEID 52 (1993) (citing a confidential HOLC survey of St. Louis real estate that 
warned about the “rapidly increasing Negro population” and the problem this would 
cause for the maintenance of property values). 
 30. See GORDON, supra note 9, at 94. 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/10
2015] SETTING THE STAGE FOR FERGUSON 1057 
 
black families could move.31  The unavailability of mortgage capital in these 
neighborhoods further contributed to the plummeting of property values.  
With overcrowding and falling property values came the deterioration of 
housing stock, rising crime, and substandard city services.32  The racist belief 
thus became a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
By 1945, roughly 300 neighborhood covenants were in force throughout 
the City.33  That same year, J.D. and Ethel Shelley, a black couple, purchased 
a small rowhouse at 4600 Labadie Avenue in the Fairground District of St. 
Louis.34  The houses in the neighborhood were subject to a covenant, which 
had been agreed upon by thirty out of the original thirty-nine property own-
ers.35  The covenant prohibited any house from being occupied “by any per-
son not of the Caucasian race” and specifically stated that it was intended to 
prevent “the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said property 
for resident or other purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.”36  
Louis and Fern Kraemer, a white couple who lived in the neighborhood, sued 
to enforce the covenant.37 
The Supreme Court of Missouri sided with the Kraemers, determining 
that the covenant was a valid agreement and that its enforcement by the court 
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, which only applied to “a state 
action exclusively.”38  Indeed, to hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would 
be “to deny the parties to such an agreement one of the fundamental privileg-
es of citizenship, access to the courts.”39 
 
 31. Id. at 78 (citing a 1947 report of the St. Louis Urban League, which found 
that approximately 97% of the black population of St. Louis lived in the city center 
and that they faced a critical lack of housing). 
 32. See id. at 223 (“As a rapidly growing African American population crowded 
into hastily but strictly circumscribed blocks or neighborhoods, the immediate conse-
quence was not only extreme stress on the housing stock but also an easy equation of 
overcrowding, crime, poor sanitation, and poor health with black occupancy itself.”). 
 33. Id. at 75. 
 34. Id. at 82. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Mo. 1946) (en banc), reversed, 
334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 37. GORDON, supra note 9, at 82.  Significantly, tax-exempt religious organiza-
tions joined in this fight – on the side of the Kraemers.  Rothstein, supra note 17, at 
15.  Richard Rothstein reports that the Cote Brilliante Presbyterian Church and the 
Waggoner Place Methodist Episcopal Church South (also a covenant signatory) pro-
vided funds to support the Kraemers’ lawsuit.  Id. 
 38. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d at 683. 
 39. Id.  Interestingly, the court did express some sympathy for the plight of the 
black residents of St. Louis who were unable to move out of their overcrowded 
neighborhoods because of restrictive covenants: 
 
The [lower court] found the negro population in St.Louis [sic] has greatly in-
creased in recent years, and now numbers in excess of 100,000; and that some 
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The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Missouri Supreme Court’s deci-
sion, ruling that the coercive power of the courts to enforce the covenant was 
clearly state action, and thus subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.40  Shelley 
v. Kraemer, which made restrictive covenants unenforceable throughout the 
United States, was thus one of the earliest and most important decisions in 
favor of the cause of fair housing.41 
B.  Act 2: Jones v. Mayer (1968) 
While Shelley v. Kraemer was an unquestionable civil rights victory, 
nothing about the case stopped people and institutions from engaging in pri-
vate acts of housing discrimination.  Racially restrictive covenants were no 
longer enforceable by law, but people were still free to enter into such volun-
tary agreements, a point made clear by the Supreme Court opinion.42  Sellers 
could – and did – simply refuse to sell their homes to minority buyers.43 
St. Louis real estate agents continued to refuse to sell homes in white 
neighborhoods to blacks.44  They drew up their own “restricted” (black) and 
“unrestricted” (white) zones on the map.45  They aggressively steered black 
homeseekers away from unrestricted neighborhoods and often outright lied to 
them about the availability of houses in unrestricted areas.46  In the 1920s, 
both the Real Estate Exchange and the Missouri Real Estate Commission had 
adopted a code of ethics that prohibited “introducing into a neighborhood . . . 
members of any race or nationality . . . whose presence will clearly be detri-
 
of the sections in which negroes live are overcrowded, which is detrimental to 
their moral and physical well being. 
 
Such living conditions bring deep concern to everyone, and present a grave 
and acute problem to the entire community.  Their correction should strikingly 
challenge both governmental and private leadership.  It is tragic that such con-
ditions seem to have worsened although much has been written and said on 
the subject from coast to coast.  But their correction is beyond the authority of 
the courts generally, and in particular in a case involving the determination of 
contractual rights between parties to a law suit [sic].  If their correction is 
sought in the field of government, the appeal must be addressed to its branch-
es other than the judicial. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 40. Shelley, 334 U.S. 1, 20. 
 41. Id. 
 42. “[T]he restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as a viola-
tion of any rights guaranteed to [the Shelleys] by the Fourteenth Amendment.  So 
long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to 
their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action by the State and the 
provisions of the Amendment have not been violated.”  Id. at 13. 
 43. GORDON, supra note 9, at 82. 
 44. Id. at 84. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 84–87. 
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mental to property values in that neighborhood.”47  Thus, selling a home in a 
white neighborhood to a black buyer would constitute professional miscon-
duct and cause a realtor to lose his or her license.48  In the wake of Shelley, 
St. Louis realtors doubled down on their adherence to this standard.49  The 
Exchange immediately approved a recommendation that no realtor sell to 
blacks or assist in the financing of any sale to black buyers for property “out-
side of the established unrestricted districts.”50  In 1955, the Exchange sent a 
notice to its members warning that “no Member of our Board may . . . sell to 
Negroes . . . unless there are three separate and distinct buildings in such 
block already occupied by Negroes.”51 
Again, these practices were motivated by the belief that the presence of 
blacks in a neighborhood would ruin property values and that once black 
families gained entry into a place, it would quickly lead to neighborhood 
turnover.  Nevertheless, with the unenforceability of covenants and a growing 
number of private sales, black residents slowly began to make inroads into 
new neighborhoods within the City.  Some realtors then engaged in the prac-
tice of blockbusting – stirring up racial anxiety in a neighborhood at the no-
tion of black encroachment and inducing the white residents to sell.52  Real-
tors sometimes purchased the properties themselves at a “panic sale” discount 
and then re-sold them at a much higher price to black families moving in.53  
Again, the realtors and white residents caused their fears about neighborhood 
instability to become self-fulfilling prophecies. 
At the same time, urban renewal and redevelopment projects demol-
ished some existing black neighborhoods in the City and led to the disloca-
tion of thousands of black residents.54  Those residents who were fortunate 
enough to get relocation assistance were often placed in large-scale public 
housing projects, such as the infamous Pruitt-Igoe complex.55  The vast ma-
jority of these projects were concentrated within black neighborhoods in the 
City – virtually none were built outside of the City limits.56  The effect was to 
entrench both poverty and segregation in these neighborhoods, while allow-
ing the St. Louis County suburbs to develop as middle-class white enclaves. 
Although Shelley caused the FHA to officially eliminate its insistence 
on racially-restrictive covenants and to refuse to insure properties covered by 
new covenants, this policy did not apply to those covenants already in 
 
 47. Id. at 83. 
 48. Id. at 84. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 85–86; Rothstein, supra note 17, at 26. 
 52. Rothstein, supra note 17, at 25. 
 53. Id. 
 54. GORDON, supra note 9, at 99–100.  Professor Gordon points to the enormous 
Mill Creek renewal project, which displaced over 16,000 people, nearly all of whom 
were black.  Id. at 99. 
 55. Id. at 100. 
 56. Id. 
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place.57  Moreover, the local FHA office continued to rely on the racially-
driven neighborhood ratings developed by HOLC, which continued to give C 
ratings to the City neighborhoods that blacks were moving into and D ratings 
to all of St. Louis’s predominantly black neighborhoods.58  Well into the 
1950s and 1960s, FHA manuals continued to prioritize neighborhood homo-
geneity, and the St. Louis FHA office warned against changes in the “social 
characteristics” of neighborhood occupants.59  As a practical matter, this 
meant that the vast majority of FHA-backed mortgages went to the rapidly 
developing all-white neighborhoods in St. Louis County.  Between 1934 and 
1960, 84% of FHA mortgages in the area went to properties outside the 
City.60  And because black buyers were prevented by discrimination from 
accessing these markets, virtually none of them were able to obtain an FHA-
backed mortgage.  Out of 400,000 FHA mortgages made in the St. Louis 
metro area between 1962 and 1967, only 3.3% went to black borrowers.61  
For black borrowers in St. Louis County, that figure dropped to below 1%.62 
Bolstered by FHA mortgages, whites began to flee the City in record 
numbers, and developers were there to meet this growing demand.  One of 
the most successful was Alfred H. Mayer, whose eponymous company ac-
quired a large parcel of land next to the Paddock Country Club and golf 
course in North St. Louis County.63  Mayer subdivided the property and 
named the subdivision Paddock Woods.64  In 1965, Joseph Lee and Barbara 
Jo Jones, a married couple, were seeking to move out of their overcrowded 
neighborhood in the City and into the suburbs.65  They viewed a display 
house at Paddock Woods and liked it enough to put in an offer for a lot on 
Hyde Park Drive.66  They were informed by a Mayer sales agent that Mayer 
would not consider their purchase offer because Joseph Jones was black, and 
it was Mayer’s “general policy not to sell houses and lots to Negroes.”67 
The Joneses filed suit, alleging violations of the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution, as well as violations of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, which was later re-codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82.68  
Section 1981 holds in part that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . 
 
 57. Id. at 91. 
 58. Id. at 93. 
 59. Id. at 91–92. 
 60. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 29, at 54; GORDON, supra note 9, at 96. 
 61. GORDON, supra note 9, at 96. 
 62. Id.  This figure represented just 56 borrowers.  Id. 
 63. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115, 118 (E.D. Mo. 1966), re-
versed, 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 64. Brief for Petitioner, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, (No. 645), 
1968 WL 129310 at *5. 
 65. Id. at *7. 
 66. Jones, 255 F. Supp. at 118. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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as is enjoyed by white citizens.”69  Section 1982 states simply that “[a]ll citi-
zens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territo-
ry, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property.”70 
The sticking point for the Joneses’ claim was the issue left untouched by 
Shelley v. Kraemer: the fact that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and the Civil Rights Act, which was meant to enforce them, had historically 
been viewed as applying only to government actions.  Indeed, the District 
Court dismissed the Joneses’ complaint on this basis, which was upheld by 
the Eighth Circuit.71 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed and found that § 1982 was in 
fact intended to reach private acts of race discrimination.72  From a legal 
standpoint, this decision was extraordinary.  Never before had the Supreme 
Court interpreted the Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes as reaching pure-
ly private conduct – the dissent pointed out how implausible it is that the 
Congress which passed these statutes in 1866 would have ever intended them 
to reach so far.73 
The Jones decision would have been truly monumental if other events 
had not overshadowed it.  Two days after the oral argument before the Su-
preme Court, Dr. Martin Luther King was assassinated, and riots engulfed 
several American cities.74  One week later, President Johnson signed the Fair 
Housing Act – the nation’s first comprehensive remedial civil rights law di-
rected to housing – into law.75  The Fair Housing Act prohibited all manner of 
discrimination in housing, and thus provided all the protections that the hold-
ing in Jones v. Mayer did and then some, a fact that the Court acknowledged 
when it handed down its opinion two months later.76 
Although the Joneses ultimately won their case, they were never able to 
buy a house in the Paddock Woods development.77  While their lawsuit 
wound its way through the courts, the couple instead settled on a more mod-
estly-priced ranch house a few miles away in Florissant.78  A week after the 
Supreme Court’s decision came down, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported 
 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). 
 70. Id. § 1982. 
 71. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412 (1968). 
 72. Id. at 480. 
 73. Id. at 436. 
 74. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, OYEZ PROJECT, 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/645 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015); Martin Luther 
King, Jr., ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/biography/Martin-
Luther-King-Jr (last visited Oct. 14, 2015). 
 75. Fair Housing Act, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
topic/Fair-Housing-Act (last visited Oct. 3, 2015). 
 76. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413–14. 
 77. Darrell A.H. Miller, White Cartels, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the 
History of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 999, 1038 (2008). 
 78. Id. at 1038–39. 
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that all of the Paddock Woods homes had been sold and that the market price 
of the homes had “risen considerably from the $28,500 that the Jones were 
prepared to pay in 1965.”79 
C.  Act 3: United States v. City of Black Jack (1974) 
As important a turning point as the year 1968 was for the fair housing 
movement, it also marked the beginning of the true exodus of whites from St. 
Louis City.  The City’s population fell by almost 170,000 between 1970 and 
1980, as whites abandoned the City for the outlying areas.80  The most egre-
gious of discriminatory practices by private sellers, banks, and real estate 
brokers had been made illegal.  Although discriminatory attitudes were still 
prevalent, and private acts of discrimination continued to occur, it was no 
longer safe to engage in overt discrimination, or to discriminate as an official 
policy. 
Exclusionary zoning was one method of preventing black families from 
moving into the virtually all-white municipalities in St. Louis County.81  In 
contrast to the explicitly racial zoning of fifty years earlier, these racially 
neutral zoning ordinances did things like require single family homes on large 
lots that would be out of the price range for many black families – who were 
either renters or the owners of houses in the City with comparatively little 
value – and bar the construction of public housing, low-income housing, and 
even multi-family housing (i.e., apartment buildings) that would be likely to 
attract black occupants.82 
The desire for exclusionary zoning also contributed to the proliferation 
of tiny municipalities around the City of St. Louis.  Until recently, there were 
few rules for municipal incorporation in Missouri.  Developers continued 
creating subdivisions in unincorporated areas outside of the City, primarily 
catering to the fleeing whites.83  These subdivisions would then incorporate.84 
There were a number of benefits to incorporation, one of which was that they 
could enact exclusionary zoning ordinances with the purpose of excluding 
lower income people and blacks from the City.85  This led to a patchwork 
quilt of ninety-one separate municipal entities in St. Louis counties, some less 
than one square mile in area and many with fewer than 2000 residents.86 
 
 79. Id. (quoting Couple’s House Hunt Is Still On, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
June 23, 1968, at 13A). 
 80. GORDON, supra note 9, at 25. 
 81. Id. at 131. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. at 152. 
 85. Id. at 147. 
 86. Municipalities, ST. LOUIS CTY., MO., http://www.stlouisco.com/
YourGovernment/Municipalities (last visited Oct. 3, 2015). 
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Black Jack was one such newly-formed community.87  In 1970, it was 
part of a large, unincorporated area governed by St. Louis County.88  The 
population was 99% white.89  In the area that would later become the City of 
Black Jack, virtually all of the land was either occupied by single family 
homes or undeveloped.90  In 1969, a nonprofit organization called the Inter 
Religious Center for Urban Affairs (“ICUA”) began planning a development 
called Park View Heights in the area, which was “to create alternative hous-
ing opportunities for persons of low and moderate income living in the ghetto 
areas of St. Louis.”91  The ICUA located a suitable parcel of land and put in 
an option for it.92  The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”) issued a feasibility letter in 1970, essentially greenlighting the pro-
ject for federal funding.93  Opposition by the area residents was both fierce 
and swift.94  They immediately began a drive to incorporate the area, which 
included the proposed project.95  Two months after the feasibility letter, the 
City of Black Jack was incorporated.96  Two months after that, the City’s first 
official act was to pass a zoning ordinance prohibiting the construction of any 
new multifamily dwellings.97 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) challenged the zoning ordinance in 
federal court, alleging that it was motivated by racial animus and was dis-
criminatory in effect.98  The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
ruled in favor of the City, finding that even if some of the officials involved 
had racist motivations, “[R]acial considerations must be shown as part of the 
legislation.”99  The district court also disputed the DOJ’s statistical showing 
of disparate impact and concluded that even if the ordinance did keep black 
families from moving into the City, this fact was not a sufficient enough con-
cern to override local zoning authority.100 
The Eighth Circuit reversed, handing down the first appellate court deci-
sion to recognize the validity of the so-called disparate impact theory under 
 
 87. GORDON, supra note 9, at 147. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 149. 
 90. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1183. 
 98. Id. at 1181.  A related challenge was brought by the ICUA and the Park 
View Heights Corporation.  Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 335 F. 
Supp. 899 (E.D. Mo. 1971). 
 99. United States v. City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. 319, 329 (E.D. Mo. 1974). 
 100. Id. at 330. 
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the Fair Housing Act.101  This theory holds that even a facially neutral action 
can violate antidiscrimination law if it disproportionately affects a particular 
group without serving a legitimate business reason or compelling government 
interest.102  The Eighth Circuit found that a disparate impact was indeed pre-
sent: “The ultimate effect of the ordinance was to foreclose 85 percent of the 
blacks living in the metropolitan area from obtaining housing in Black Jack, 
and to foreclose them at a time when 40 percent of them were living in sub-
standard or overcrowded units.”103  The Supreme Court denied certiorari.104  
Today, this case is one of the most-commonly cited in support of the dispar-
ate impact principle in fair housing cases.105 
Although the Eighth Circuit’s opinion was based on the existence of a 
disparate impact, the court went out of its way to make clear that this did not 
mean that the ordinance’s supporters were free of racial animus.106  To the 
contrary, it found: 
There is evidence in the record to support [the] contention [that the 
purpose of the ordinance was to exclude blacks].  Opposition to Park 
View Heights was repeatedly expressed in racial terms by persons 
whom the District Court found to be the leaders of the incorporation 
movement, by individuals circulating petitions, and by zoning com-
missioners themselves.  Racial criticism of Park View Heights was 
made and cheered at public meetings.  The uncontradicted evidence 
indicates that, at all levels of opposition, race played a significant role, 
both in the drive to incorporate and the decision to rezone.107 
Despite a victory in the courts, the supporters of mixed income multi-
family housing in Black Jack failed to achieve their objective.108  By the time 
the Eight Circuit’s opinion came down, the proposed site had been bought 
back by the City.109  HUD’s support for the project had waned, financing was 
 
 101. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1188.  The disparate impact standard had first been 
recognized by the Supreme Court in the context of employment discrimination and 
Title VII in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power.  401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 102. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430–32.  Even if such an interest is shown, a plaintiff can 
still prevail by showing that the interest can be met through alternate means that do 
not create the disparate impact.  Id. 
 103. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186. 
 104. City of Black Jack v. United States, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). 
 105. This year, for the first time, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the viability 
of disparate impact theory in fair housing cases.  Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs 
v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).  The theory was upheld by a 
narrow majority.  Id. at 2526. 
 106. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186. 
 107. Id. at 1188 n.3. 
 108. GORDON, supra note 9, at 150. 
 109. Id. 
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difficult because of rising interest rates, and the hostility toward such projects 
had only intensified.110 
III.  TODAY  
This depressing history boils down to one basic truth: The black popula-
tion of St. Louis City and County has a long history of being denied access to 
one of the most significant sources of wealth accumulation for most Ameri-
cans – a home, in a stable and functioning neighborhood, purchased on rea-
sonable terms.  All of the discriminatory forces that skewed the housing mar-
kets decade after decade – and by extension the tax bases, school systems, 
and development patterns – are evident in the map of the metro area today.  
Black people in St. Louis are no longer held back by legalized discrimination, 
but as one commentator notes, “Policies that are no longer in effect and seem-
ingly have been reformed still cast a long shadow.”111 
Today, the house that the Shelleys purchased in 1948 sits on a run-down 
block in a neighborhood that is now 100% black.112  Much of the City’s black 
population has moved northward into the inner-ring municipalities.113  The 
Paddock Woods subdivision now has a majority black population114 – ironi-
cally, testing in the late 1990s revealed that real estate agents in the area were 
actually steering black prospective buyers to the neighborhood.115  The City 
of Black Jack is now 81.5% black.116  Whites, meanwhile, have continued to 
 
 110. Id.  Professor Gordon quotes one of the Park View Heights lawyers as say-
ing, “No developer in his or her right mind . . . at this point in time would go into the 
City of Black Jack and attempt to build low and moderate income housing . . . .”  Id. 
 111. Rothstein, supra note 17, at 4. 
 112. Google Street View reveals a number of vacant lots and boarded up buildings 
on the blocks near where the house is located.  Google Street View of 4600 Labadie 
Ave., St. Louis, Mo., GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps (search for 
“4600 Labadie Ave., St. Louis, Mo.” and click “Street View”).  A census-mapping 
website indicates that the neighborhood is over 99% black.  See Justice Map, ENERGY 
JUST. NETWORK, 
http://www.energyjustice.net/justice/index.php?gsLayer=black&gfLon=-
95.3&gfLat=39.6&giZoom=4 (search for “4600 Labadie Ave., St. Louis, Mo.” in the 
“Address” box then click “Go”).  The Trulia website estimates that the average list 
price for a home in the neighborhood is $36,416.  Property Details for 4600 Labadie 
Ave, TRULIA, http://www.trulia.com/homes/Missouri/Saint_Louis/sold/999987-4600-
Labadie-Ave-Saint-Louis-MO-63115 (last visited Oct. 3, 2015). 
 113. Rothstein, supra note 17, at 68. 
 114. One website estimates the black population in Paddock Woods as 58%.  
Paddock Woods, FINDTHEHOME, http://places.findthehome.com/l/278271/Paddock-
Woods-Florissant-MO (last visited Sept. 2, 2015). 
 115. The case in which the testing data were presented was Metropolitan St. Louis 
Equal Housing Opportunity Council v. Grundaker.  132 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (E.D. Mo. 
2001). 
 116. Black Jack Demographics, MO. DEMOGRAPHICS, http://www.missouri-
demographics.com/black-jack-demographics (last visited Sept. 6, 2015). 
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move westward and to the south, into middle-class and highly affluent neigh-
borhoods.  In fact, three of the wealthiest communities in the United States 
can be found in this part of St. Louis County: Frontenac, Ladue, and Town & 
Country,117 each of which has a black population of less than 2.6%.118  Final-
ly, the existence of so many tiny municipal governments, particularly in cash-
strapped North County, has led to a number of fiscal and management prob-
lems within the region.119  Many of these municipalities had difficulty sup-
porting their own overhead costs – separate police and fire departments, 
courts, etc. – particularly as their tax bases eroded.120 
Now let us consider how Ferguson fits into this story and how these 
events came to shape the Ferguson of today.  Incorporated in 1894, Ferguson 
began as one of the white enclaves outside of the St. Louis city limits.121  For 
decades, its black population was virtually zero, although it bordered the 
small, majority black city of Kinloch.122  Until the late 1960s, Ferguson 
blocked off the main road that connected it to Kinloch with a chain, causing 
some commentators to speculate that Ferguson was a “Sundown Town” that 
actually banned black people after dark.123  For many years since the 1930s, 
Ferguson had a single family zoning ordinance that banned virtually all 
apartment buildings – a small swath was permitted in the 1930s to create a 
buffer between the business district and the existing single family homes.124 
After 1968, with Jones v. Mayer and the passage of the Fair Housing 
Act, black families slowly began to move into Ferguson and other formerly 
all-white municipalities in North St. Louis County.125  As they did so, the 
 
 117. Andy Kiersz et al., The 25 Wealthiest Suburbs in America, BUS. INSIDER 
(Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/richest-suburbs-in-america-2014-10. 
 118. Fronteac, Missouri, CITY-DATA, http://www.city-data.com/city/Frontenac-
Missouri.html#b  (last visited Oct. 3, 2015); John Hoffmann, Tale of Four Cities and 
Traffic Stops, CHESTERFIELD PATCH (June 7, 2012), http://patch.com/
missouri/chesterfield/the-tale-of-four-cities-and-traffic-stops. 
 119. See Stephen Deere, North County Municipalities Talking about Merger of 




 120. GORDON, supra note 9, at 59.  Professor Gordon discusses the many prob-
lems this fragmented system of local government presents.  Id. at 39–68. 
 121. Ferguson, Missouri, ABOUT ST. LOUIS, http://aboutstlouis.com/local/
communities/ferguson-missouri (last visited Sept. 7, 2015); Ronald S. Martin, Fergu-
son Shows a nation at War with Itself, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 16, 2014), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/16/ferguson-shows-a-nation-at-war-
with-itself.html. 
 122. GORDON, supra note 9, at 146. 
 123. Id.; Rothstein, supra note 17, at 2–3; see JOHN A. WRIGHT, SR., KINLOCH: 
MISSOURI’S FIRST BLACK CITY 127 (2000). 
 124. GORDON, supra note 9, at 137–38. 
 125. Id. at 147–49. 
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whites fled further west and south.  In 1970, Ferguson was still 99% white.126  
In 1980, as the pace of black mobility increased, the town was 85% white and 
14% black.127  During the 1980s, the Lambert International Airport sought to 
expand.128  The project involved taking much of the land in Kinloch from its 
relatively poor black residents.129  From 1990 to 2000, Kinloch lost over 80% 
of its population, and many of the residents displaced by the airport expan-
sion ended up in Ferguson – specifically in Canfield Green, the apartment 
complex where Michael Brown was killed.130  By 2010, Ferguson was 29% 




















 126. Paulina Firozi, 5 Things to Know about Ferguson, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/08/14/ferguson-police-
department-details/14064451/. 
 127. The Death of Michael Brown Racial History Behind the Ferguson Protests, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/opinion/racial-
history-behind-the-ferguson-protests.html. 
 128. Jeffrey Smith, You Can’t Understand Ferguson Without First Understanding 
These Three Things, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/
article/119106/ferguson-missouris-complicated-history-poverty-and-racial-tension. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Ferguson (city), Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/2923986.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2015). 
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This left an inherently unstable population mix.  In Ferguson, as in 
many of the other previously off-limits areas, the newer black entrants tended 
to be poorer132 and more transient.133  Many were renters or first-time home-
buyers.134  A disproportionate number of these new homebuyers took out 
subprime or predatory mortgages.135  More than half of the mortgages made 
in the area from 2004 to 2007 were subprime, and these mortgages were dis-
proportionately taken out by black borrowers.136  As a result, Ferguson and 
other inner-ring North County areas were hit hard by the subprime mortgage 
crises.  By 2014, roughly one of every eleven houses in the area had gone into 
foreclosure.137  Of the remaining owner-occupied homes, 50% were underwa-
ter, as compared with a national average of 17%.138 
The school population also shifted rapidly, leading to a dramatic reseg-
regation of the public schools.139  As white families fled, so too did the more 
experienced teachers and administrators.140  Black families with the means to 
 
 132. According to the 2009–2013 American Community Survey, about 25% of 
Ferguson’s population lives below the federal poverty level.  See Poverty Status in the 
Past 12 Months 2009–2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/
13_5YR/S1701/1600000US2923986 (last visited Oct. 3, 2015). 
 133. Danielle Cadet, Braden Goyette & Nick Wing, 21 Numbers That Will Help 
You Understand Why Ferguson Is About More Than Michael Brown, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/22/ferguson-black-
america_n_5694364.html. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Jim Gallagher, Blame Poverty, Age, For Weak North County Home Market, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/metro/blame-poverty-age-for-weak-north-county-home-
market/article_95c998e5-bb87-5bc0-9054-83e801b357ac.html. 
 137. Id.  This mirrors nationwide patterns of subprime lending and foreclosures in 
segregated areas.  Id.  Jacob S. Rugh and Douglas S. Massey found that the greater 
degree of black segregation a metropolitan area exhibits, the higher the number and 
rate of foreclosures it experienced.  Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Seg-
regation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 644 (2010).  
The authors note that “the housing boom and the immense profits that it generated 
frequently came at the expense of poor minorities living in central cities and inner 
suburbs who were targeted by specialized mortgage brokers and affiliates of national 
banks and subjected to discriminatory lending practices.”  Id. at 634. 
 138. Matthew Goldstein, Another Shadow in Ferguson as Outside Firms Buy and 
Rent Out Distressed Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2014), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2014/09/03/another-shadow-in-ferguson-as-outside-firms-buy-and-rent-
out-distressed-homes/. 
 139. Nikole Hannah-Jones, School Segregation, the Continuing Tragedy of Fer-
guson, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.propublica.org/article/ferguson-
school-segregation. 
 140. Id. (“[S]chools buckled under their swift demographic shift, beginning a 
steep decline.  Many of the best teachers followed the white and middle-class exodus.  
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send their children to private or charter schools did so, and the population that 
remained in the public schools in the area was disproportionately black and 
poor.141  The percentages of black students in the four school districts that 
serve Ferguson are 98.8%, 97.8%, 79.9%, and 72.9%.142  With such rapid 
demographic and economic shifts, some of the schools went into free-fall. 
One of the school districts in Ferguson, Riverview Gardens, was performing 
so poorly that it had lost its accreditation at the time of Michael Brown’s 
death.143  The Normandy School District, where Michael Brown attended 
high school, borders Ferguson.144  It is among the poorest schools in Mis-
souri, and 97.5% of its students are black.145  It ranks last in overall academic 
performance and had also lost its accreditation at the time of Michael 
Brown’s death – which was just a few days after he graduated.146 
These rapid demographic changes also led to strained relationships be-
tween Ferguson’s growing black population base and its existing white power 
structure.  At the time of Michael Brown’s death, Ferguson had a majority 
black population but a municipal government that was almost entirely white: 
The mayor was white, the School Board had six whites and one Latino, and 
the City Council had just one black member.147  The police force was just 6% 
black.148 
At the same time, Ferguson, like many of its small neighbors, dispropor-
tionately relied on revenue from traffic tickets, fines, and citations in order to 
help finance municipal operations.149  City officials worked in concert with 
the police department to maximize revenue generation through an aggressive 
system of stopping residents and citing them for as many infractions as possi-
 
Instruction fell off.  The district suffered from a revolving door of leadership, with 
principals and superintendents seldom sticking around more than a couple of years.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Mo. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., District Report Card, MO. 
COMPREHENSIVE DATA SYS., http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/guidedinquiry/School%
20Report%20Card/District%20Report%20Card.aspx?rp:SchoolYear=2014&rp:Schoo
lYear=2013&rp:SchoolYear=2012&rp:SchoolYear=2011&rp:DistrictCode=096109.  
Another product of the proliferation of tiny governments in the St. Louis Metro area 
is the fact that school districts bear little relationship to the municipal borders; thus, 
Ferguson is served by four different school districts, which it shares with other munic-
ipalities.  Schools, CITY OF FERGUSON, http://www.fergusoncity.com/165/Schools 
(last visited Sept. 7, 2015). 
 143. Charles Jaco, What’s Next for Under Performing Missouri Schools?, 
FOX2NOW ST. LOUIS, http://fox2now.com/2014/01/25/whats-next-for-under-
performing-missouri-schools/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2015). 
 144. Hannah-Jones, supra note 139. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Jeff Smith, In Ferguson, Black Town, White Power, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/opinion/in-ferguson-black-town-white-
power.html?_r=0. 
 148. Id.  Four officers out of fifty-six were black.  Id. 
 149. Id. 
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ble.150  In the period between 2010 and 2014, Ferguson police issued over 
90,000 citations and summonses for municipal violations – without any cor-
responding increase in the actual amount of serious crime.151  The burden of 
this fell on Ferguson’s black population, whose members were disproportion-
ately stopped, cited, and arrested by a police force that was overwhelmingly 
white.152  Although blacks made up roughly 67% of Ferguson’s population in 
2013, 85% of vehicle stops, 90% of citations, and 93% of arrests in Ferguson 
were of black people.153  The municipal court – whose employees were virtu-
ally all white154 – operated as part of the police department, overseen by the 
Chief of Police, and was physically located inside of the police department 
building.155  It existed primarily as a mechanism to collect fines from black 
residents, often from multiple minor offenses that would snowball with fees 
and penalties if the resident was unable to pay.156  Ultimately, a resident 
might face thousands of dollars in fines, a suspended driver’s license, and an 
arrest warrant, all for minor citations.   
The result was an explosive situation, which set the stage both for the 
death of Michael Brown and the anger and frustration that erupted afterwards.  
Of course there were many factors that contributed to what happened in Fer-
guson, but when we consider the history set forth above in the context of the 
real places involved, as in Figure 2, we can see that Ferguson was literally in 
the center of some of the most contentious and significant struggles for fair 
housing in the last century. 
   
 
 150. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 10, 11 (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/
2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 
 151. Id. at 7. 
 152. Id. at 5, 7. 
 153. Id. at 4. 
154. The Municipal Judge, Prosecuting Attorney, Court Clerk, and all assistant 
court clerks were white.  Id. at 8. 
 155. Id. at 8. 
 156. Id. at 3–4. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
What lessons can we take from this story?  To begin, with respect to 
housing in the St. Louis metropolitan area, the playing field was never level, 
the market was never free, and housing opportunity was never truly equal.  It 
is simply impossible for a region – and a people – to experience so many 
years of sustained, systemic interference with such a foundational resource as 
housing without profound repercussions.  To the extent that Ferguson – and 
the entire metropolitan area – suffers from segregation, a skewed housing 
market, and dysfunctional local government, such outcomes are the direct 
byproducts of a century’s worth of discriminatory policies and practices in 
the region.  These actions, based on a racist fear of the conflict, depressed 
property values and social problems that would supposedly come if black 
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people’s housing choices were not restricted, managed to create exactly those 
effects.157  The past, indeed, is prologue. 
From this, we can draw a conclusion: These problems, so long and de-
liberate in the making, will not magically fix themselves.  Court victories 
against private and public discrimination are not enough.  Neighborhoods will 
not simply integrate (and a snapshot that looks like integration is more likely 
to be an area that, like Ferguson, is transitioning).  Black residents of St. Lou-
is City and County cannot easily make up the lost opportunity to accumulate 
wealth over generations that homeownership in a stable, prosperous neigh-
borhood would have provided. 
Coming up with solutions is more difficult.  In the wake of what hap-
pened in Ferguson, a number of measures have already been taken to reform 
the police department and the municipal reliance on fines for revenue genera-
tion.158  Commentators have proposed consolidation of small local govern-
ments, which would help cash-strapped North County communities obtain 
economies of scale.159  There are nearly constant calls for changes to the 
school districting and funding mechanisms.160 
But what can be done now with respect to housing, which created so 
many of the area’s underlying problems to begin with?  Here, the solutions 
are less obvious and more incremental.  Predatory and subprime mortgage 
lending must be aggressively policed, and fair lending enforcement must con-
tinue to ensure that black borrowers are not discriminated against.  Assistance 
must continue to be provided to those borrowers whose homes are still un-
derwater, in the form of refinancing programs such as the federal govern-
ment’s Home Affordable Refinance Program (“HARP”).161  Fair housing 
enforcement must be vigilant in Ferguson, where many foreclosed-upon 
properties are now being held by out-of-state investment firms.162 
But it is not enough to simply enforce the laws against discrimination.  
Affirmative steps must be taken to promote integration.  In particular, black 
families in the St. Louis metropolitan area must be empowered to leave seg-
regated areas with concentrated poverty for higher opportunity neighbor-
 
 157. Rothstein, supra note 17, at 2. 
 158. See Ferguson Approves Reforms, Crowd Wants Answers, NBC NEWS (Sept. 
9, 2014, 9:24 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-shooting/
ferguson-approves-reforms-crowd-demands-answers-n199681. 
 159. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 9, at 46–49; Smith, supra note 147. 
 160. Moving Ferguson Forward: Mayor and City Council Goals and Progress, 
CITY OF FERGUSON, http://www.fergusoncity.com/531/Moving-Ferguson-Forward 
(last visited Sept. 7, 2015). 
 161. See Home Affordable Refinance Program in Ferguson, MO, FERGUSON 
HARP PROGRAM, http://ferguson-mo.harploanprogram.net/ (last visited Sept. 7, 
2015). 
 162. See Matthew Goldstein, Another Shadow in Ferguson as Outside Firms Buy 
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hoods.  A recent analysis prepared for St. Louis County found that black and 
white County residents experience significant disparities in access to oppor-
tunity, based on their living patterns and neighborhood conditions.163  Access 
to neighborhood opportunity was measured, in part, by how exposed resi-
dents were to poverty, the proficiency of their schools, labor market engage-
ment in the neighborhood, and access to jobs.164  On all of these measures, 
blacks were significantly worse off than whites.165 
One way to promote integration and increase access to opportunity is 
through the administration of programs for low-income and affordable hous-
ing.  The IRS should alter its formula for Low-Income Housing Tax Credits 
(“LIHTC”), to incentivize the development of affordable housing in high 
opportunity areas.166  This would help provide lower and moderate income 
black residents with access to better schools and municipal services.  Current-
ly, program requirements that LIHTC properties be built in areas with high 
poverty mean that low income housing continues to be concentrated in minor-
ity areas.167  Among all LIHTC properties in the St. Louis metropolitan area, 
62% of properties are in census tracts that are majority black.168  In St. Louis 
County alone, over the past five years, seven out of ten developments that 
have received the most preferred type of tax credit have been in North Coun-
ty, which is heavily minority.169  In that same vein, Missouri should add 
source of income protections to its human rights statute, which would require 
landlords to accept Housing Choice (commonly referred to as “Section 8”) 
Vouchers.  This would allow voucher-holders greater flexibility in choosing 
where to live and enable some to move out of areas of concentrated segrega-
tion and poverty – which are currently where the majority of properties will-
ing to accept the vouchers are located. 
In addition, HUD and local Housing Authorities can make improve-
ments to its rental assistance programs so that these programs themselves do 
not exacerbate racial and economic segregation.  The Center on Budget and 
 
 163. WFN CONSULTING, ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO FAIR HOUSING CHOICE: 
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, CITIES OF FLORISSANT AND O’FALLON, MISSOURI 132 
(Dec. 2014), http://wfnconsulting.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/St-Louis-Co-AI-
FINAL.pdf. 
 164. Id. at 6. 
 165. Id. at 131–33. 
 166. See Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community Revitalization: Apply-
ing the Fair Housing Act to the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
1747, 1753–54, (2005). 
 167. Editorial, Affordable Housing, Racial Isolation, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/opinion/affordable-housing-racial-
isolation.html. 
 168. See Letter from Metro. St. Louis Equal Hous. Opportunity Council to Mo. 
Hous. Dev. Comm’n, at 1 (June 9, 2015) http://www.prrac.org/pdf/Comments_on_
MHDC_2016_Draft_QAP_Letter_06-09-15.pdf (addressing 2016 Qualified Alloca-
tion Plan). 
 169. Id. 
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Policy Priorities recommends a number of policy changes that will encourage 
low-income families who use Housing Choice Vouchers to move to lower-
poverty communities, which will in many, if not most, cases decrease racial 
segregation.170  For example, HUD could reward agencies that help families 
move to so-called “high opportunity areas” with additional funding and ex-
tend the search period allowed for families who seek to make such moves.171  
At the same time, HUD could revise its metro-wide fair market rent system 
and modify its administrative geography to reduce the extent to which exist-
ing service area boundaries interfere with agencies’ ability to help families 
move into high opportunity areas.172 
Indeed, HUD can, should, and likely will play a more active role in po-
licing municipalities, to ensure that they use federal housing funds in a man-
ner that actively promotes integration and housing choice.  HUD is responsi-
ble for the distribution and oversight of several key sources of federal hous-
ing funds, the most significant of which is the Community Development 
Block Grant (“CDBG”).173  The funds, which totaled $3 billion for fiscal year 
2014, are distributed to roughly 1200 jurisdictions across the country.174  The 
federal Fair Housing Act directs HUD to administer its programs and activi-
ties “in a manner affirmatively to further the [FHA’s] policies.”175  Although 
the term “affirmatively further fair housing” is not defined, the legislative 
history of the FHA makes clear that Congress intended for the statute both to 
eradicate housing discrimination and to foster integrated living patterns.176  
After decades of rather moribund enforcement of this requirement,177 HUD 
has recently revitalized its efforts to ensure that grant recipients take their 
 
 170. Barbara Sard & Douglas Rice, Creating Opportunity for Children: How 
Housing Location Can Make a Difference, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 
(Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/research/creating-opportunity-for-
children#_3_0_1. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Community Development Block Grant Program, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV. (last visited Oct. 4, 2015), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/
program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevelopment/programs. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2012).  The statute that created 
the CDBG also requires grant recipients to certify to HUD that their grant will be 
administered in conformity with the FHA and that the recipient will use the funds in 
such a manner to “affirmatively further fair housing.”  See id. § 5304(b)(2). 
 176. See Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated 
Housing: A Back-To-The-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s “Affirmatively 
Further” Mandate, 100 KY. L.J. 125, 127–28 (2011–2012) (noting that Congress 
passed the FHA shortly after the National Commission on Civil Disorders published 
its famous report describing the United States as increasingly segregated, and calling 
for “open housing” legislation to remedy this problem). 
 177. Id. at 153–54 (noting that for many years few grants were denied or rescind-
ed, and no noncompliant grantees were threatened with remedial action). 
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obligations under the Fair Housing Act seriously.178  In a particularly encour-
aging move, HUD has recently issued a new rule, which strengthens this 
mandate and offers concrete tools for HUD to assist communities that receive 
federal housing funds.179  In particular, HUD will provide publicly open data 
and mapping tools to communities so that they can set fair housing goals, 
provide incentives for regional collaboration and expand access to high op-
portunity neighborhoods, and facilitate community participation in the plan-
ning process.180 
None of these will produce instant results.  While the demographics on a 
map may shift, patterns of segregation are stubborn.  Attitudes about race and 
place may be even more so.  The quote at the beginning of this Article refers 
to the past as prologue, but perhaps the words of William Faulkner summa-
rize it better: “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”181 
 
 
 178. Housing Fairness Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 476 Before the Subcomm. on 
Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 110 (2010) 
(statement of John D. Trasvina HUD Assistant Sec’y for Fair Hous. & Equal Oppor-
tunity) (“HUD has not always fulfilled its obligation to ensure that our money is spent 
in ways that affirmatively further fair housing.  In this new day, however, there is a 
Department-wide commitment to incorporate our mandate to affirmatively further fair 
housing into all of our work so that we can fulfill our shared goal of truly integrated 
and balanced living patterns.”). 
 179. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015).  
The Rule went into effect on August 17, 2015.  Id. 
 180. HUD Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV., http://www.huduser.org/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/AFFH_Final
_Rule_Executive_Summary.pdf. 
 181. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN, act 1, sc. 3 (1951). 
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